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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates whether deficiencies detected during port state
control (PSC) inspections have predictive power for future accident risk, in
addition to other vessel-specific risk factors like ship type, age, size, flag, and
owner. The empirical analysis links accidents to past inspection outcomes
and is based on data from all around the globe of PSC regimes using
harmonized deficiency codes. These codes are aggregated into eight
groups related to human factor aspects like crew qualifications, working
and living conditions, and fatigue and safetymanagement. This information
is integrated by principal components into a single overall deficiency index,
which is related to future accident risk by means of logit models. The factor
by which accident risk increases for vessels with above average compared
to below average deficiency scores is about 6 for total loss, 2 for very
serious, 1.5 for serious, and 1.3 for less-serious accidents. Relations between
deficiency scores and accident risk are presented in graphical format. The
results may be of interest to PSC authorities for targeting inspection areas,
to maritime administrations for improving asset allocation based on pre-
diction scenarios connected with vessel traffic data, and to maritime








Shipping provides the dominant transport link in international trade, with world seaborne trade
volumes surpassing ten billion pounds in 2015 (UNCTAD, 2016). Managing safety at sea is of
major importance to protect not only the safety of crew and passengers but also that of carried
goods and the marine environment that is at peril in case of accidents. The safety level of
maritime transport currently falls in between that of less risky air traffic and more risky road
traffic (Chauvin 2011).
Over the past decades, technological developments have improved vessel reliability, but
personal and organizational aspects of safety such as bridge management have become more
complex (Hetherington, Flin, and Mearns 2006). Human factor aspects are commonly agreed to
constitute nowadays between 80 and 90% of the causes of shipping accidents (Schröder-Hinrichs
2010). The precise percentage depends on the interpretation and definition of the cause of an
accident, and it is often difficult to filter out initial events of an accident and the role of human
factors. Accident investigations can take years to complete and are usually not publicly available.
As accidents typically result from a complex interplay of various causes, most studies on human
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factors in marine accidents rely on detailed analysis of a limited number of accident reports or
case studies. This line of retrospective research has applied various analytical tools for risk
assessment by combining specific vessel operations with expert judgement (Hollnagel 1998;
Shappell and Wiegmann 2001).
The aim of this paper is to present a prospective analysis of the probability of future shipping
accidents. This analysis is based on global accident data and global deficiency information
available from port state control (PSC) inspections, with an emphasis on deficiencies related to
human factor aspects like crew qualifications, working and living conditions, and fatigue manage-
ment, as well as operational aspects including safety and pollution prevention management. The
advantage of this approach is that PSC inspection data are available around the globe and that
deficiency coding has recently been harmonized across various PSC regimes (except the United
States Coast Guard).
The proposed methodology employs data from January 2010 to June 2015, with deficiency data
from January 2009 onwards. The database comprises the global fleet and covers about 130,000
vessels in total. The main result is an explicit quantitative link between past inspection outcomes,
in particular past deficiencies related to the areas mentioned above, and the probability of future
accidents. This link is determined at various levels of aggregation, from the highest level measur-
ing total predictive power to lower levels measuring partial effects after correcting for various
other safety indicators including ship particulars like ship type, age, size, flag, class, ownership,
engine designer and builder, ship yard country, and proxies for maritime expertise. This meth-
odology does not provide a root cause analysis of accident risk in terms of previously detected
deficiencies, but it does provide insight in the question in how far future accident risk can be
predicted from previous inspection outcomes with an emphasis on deficiencies related to human
factor aspects.
The findings of this paper, and in particular the various empirical links between past inspection
outcomes and future accident risk, are of interest to maritime safety authorities as they present the
main indicators of accident risk in shipping, including human factors. They are also of interest for
maritime risk management, as accident risk and human factor aspects are quantified on the level
of individual vessels. The ship-specific risk indicators may also be of interest, for example, to
insurance companies that can charge higher premiums for lower quality vessels, which in turn
provides a financial stimulus for ship owners to improve the safety level of their fleet.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review literature on human
factor aspects in shipping accidents. Section 3 discusses the shipping and inspection data and
Section 4 describes the modelling methodology. The results are presented in Section 5, and
Section 6 provides some policy and management implications and conclusions.1
2. Human factor aspects in shipping safety
Human factors constitute an important part of the causes of shipping accidents. Reported
percentages of accidents at sea caused by human factors range between 60 and 90% (Håvold
2000; Macrae 2009; Schröder-Hinrichs 2010). Dekker (2002) stressed the importance of under-
standing causes of human errors instead of judging them, as human error does not provide an
explanation of accidents and instead safety requires better understanding of the interplay between
persons, tools, and organizational aspects. Talley, Jin, and Kite-Powell (2005; 2006) found that the
majority of accidents with crew or passenger injuries are due to human factors. Harati-Mokhtari
et al. (2007) asked attention for technological innovations and the importance of man–machine
collaboration; see also Akhtar and Utne (2015) and Mindykowski (2017). Hetherington, Flin, and
Mearns (2006) reviewed various human factors that affect safety at sea, including fatigue, auto-
mation, communication, team work, health and stress. Social and organizational factors in safety
attitudes have also been analysed by Chauvin (2011) in terms of the so-called ‘Swiss Cheese’
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model of Reason (2000), meaning that accidents often result from an accumulation of ‘holes’ in
various layers of defence.
Fatigue is an important human factor in accident causation. Wadsworth et al. (2006) and Allen,
Wadsworth, and Smith (2008) noted that working conditions of seafarers can be exceptionally
fatiguing due to factors like night work, ship motions, noise and vibration, and work load and
stress. Berg, Storgård, and Lappalainen (2013) provided a literature review on the impact of ship
crews on maritime safety. We mention some recent studies; see also Jepsen, Zhoa, and Van
Leeuwen (2015) for an extensive literature study. Oltedal and Wadsworth (2010) investigated the
relation between safety culture, shipboard safety, and organizational factors. Akhtar and Utne
(2015) considered fatigue-related groundings and collisions, and Besikci, Tavacioglu, and Arslan
(2016) analysed stress and fatigue of seafarers. Progoulaki and Theotokas (2016) discussed
managing crews of mixed nationalities. Ugurlu (2016) reported systematic breaches of labour
conventions, Pauksztat (2017) found fatigue effects of ships’ schedules, and Chung, Lee, and Lee
(2017) studied burnout of seafarers and its effect on safety.
Several initiatives have been taken to manage safety at sea by means of internationally agreed
regulations. An early example is the international convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (IMO
1974). The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping
(STCW) for Seafarers (United Nations 1984) initially dealt only with qualifications and was later
extended by the so-called Manila Amendments (IMO 2010) to include also personal, group, and
leadership skills. Further, the International Safety Management (ISM) code (IMO 1993, 2005) and
its various amendments concerned organizational conditions for safe shipboard operations and
demanded, among others, continuous improvement of safety management skills. Another impor-
tant agreement is the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) (ILO [2006] 2014) that deals with
living and working conditions. Recent empirical assessment studies of these agreements include
Akyuz, Karahalios, and Celik (2015) for MLC, Pantouvakis and Karakasnaki (2016) for ISM, and
Ugurlu, Kum, and Aydogdu (2017) for STCW. Karahalios (2017) discussed the role and evalua-
tion of expert knowledge in the maritime regulatory field. Schröder-Hinrichs et al. (2013) and
Karahalios, Yang, and Wang (2014) argued that some maritime regulations have led to a variety of
interpretations and implementation practices by flags and ship owners. Further, notwithstanding
the obvious importance of safety regulations and accountability, Knudsen (2009) warned that
increasing administrative burden for seafarers may lead to problematic relations with regulatory
authorities and ship owners.
Empirical studies on human factors in transport safety are often based on accident reports and
use models that integrate the various accident factors mentioned in these reports with expert
opinions on the likelihood of their occurrence. Popular techniques, partly originating from
aviation and aerospace, include the cognitive reliability error analysis method CREAM
(Hollnagel 1998) and the human factors analysis and classification system HFACS (Shappell
and Wiegmann 2001). Maritime applications of these techniques were presented, among others,
by Wu et al. (2017) for CREAM and by Chauvin et al. (2013) for HFACS. Yang, Wang, and Li
(2013) reviewed various approaches that have been used to quantify maritime transportation risks,
see also Li et al. (2014). Reason (1990) questioned the reliability of accident reports because they
are often directed at attributing blame. Lundberg, Rollenhagen, and Hollnagel (2010) warned for
biases in these reports and Hänninen (2014) discussed complications in textual interpretation.
Several other complications in using accident reports for safety analysis have been reported,
among others, by Sharit et al. (2000) and Hetherington, Flin, and Mearns (2006). Nowadays,
the most comprehensive collection of mandatory incident investigations is that of the Global
Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) of the International Maritime Organization
(IMO). These investigations are analysed by experts and lessons learnt are disseminated to the
industry by IMO via its relevant committee. This is nowadays the only form of root cause analysis
of global accident data available in the shipping industry. Other safety studies in shipping relied
on surveys among maritime agents to obtain empirical data directly from this broad and diverse
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area. A recent example is Fenstad, Dahl, and Kongsvik (2016), who considered the perceived
safety climate reported by crew members as indication of shipboard safety.
Summarizing the above review, human factor aspects are of major importance for safety at sea
and international regulations try to improve safety conditions and safety management. Empirical
safety studies fall mostly in two categories, retrospective studies based on a limited set of accident
investigation reports or surveys to measure working conditions and safety climate. Such studies
have evident value, but it is difficult to translate such relatively small-scale studies into general
policy recommendations. We will therefore analyse safety from a different angle, in terms of safety
hazards—including human factor aspects—detected during PSC inspections. Such an approach
has been proposed (but not yet followed) before, see Håvold (2010) and Schröder-Hinrichs
(2010). Compared to previous human factor safety studies, our methodology has the advantage
of being
(i) prospective, as past inspection data are related to future accidents;
(ii) global, as it involves a global dataset covering the world fleet;
(iii) specific, as it provides risk assessment at the level of individual vessels
(iv) flexible, as it can be combined with a range of other risk factors.
3. Data
The database contains global data obtained from various data sources on ship particulars,
casualties, and PSC inspection outcomes. It covers the world fleet and contains in principle one
observation per vessel per year for 2010–2014 and the first half of 2015 for all variables, as well as
casualty and inspection data for 2009. Extracts of ship particulars and inspection data are obtained
from IHS Markit that manages the IMO numbering schemes.
Accident data in the shipping industry, especially those from commercial data providers, show
limitations due to poor data quality and under-reporting of less-serious (LS) accidents. We
combined data from three different sources (IHS Markit, LLIS, and IMO) and we identified
and removed duplicates across these sources. This combination reduces the degree of under-
reporting, especially for serious and LS accidents. Data on total loss and very serious accidents are
quite complete, also due to media coverage. The three data providers use different classifications
of the degree of seriousness of accidents, and first events are often not identified correctly leading
to misclassification of accident types. We reclassified the seriousness of accidents according to
IMO definitions (IMO 2000), which are very serious including total loss (TLVS), serious (S), and
LS. For the purpose and scope of this study, we only consider degree of seriousness and we do not
differentiate accident types.
The inspection data are of particular importance for our study. We took special care to
minimize potential port-related selection bias. Vessel treatment can vary per port depending on
training standards of PSC inspectors, status of harmonization of PSC regime operational
approaches, and port specific conditions, see Knapp (2006), Knapp and Franses (2007), Knapp
and Van de Velden (2009), and Ravira and Piniella (2016). This potential source of inspection
selection bias was reduced by employing global inspection data based on previous findings in the
literature (Knapp 2006; Bijwaard and Knapp 2009; Heij, Bijwaard, and Knapp 2011), as follows.
First, only initial inspections are included and any possible follow-up inspections resulting directly
from the initial one are excluded. Second, the inspection and deficiency data originate from a
global cross-section of five PSC regimes covering the major global ship traffic regions (North and
South America, Europe, and Asia). The resulting database contains more than 600,000 deficien-
cies, covering about 60% of the world total for the analysis period (January 2010 to June 2015).
This large cross-selection reduces the amount of bias in deficiency data because it covers a wide
selection of ports and countries with different targeting factors and vessel treatments across the
major trading nations.
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For all data types, missing are whenever possible complemented to improve data quality.
Inspection and deficiency data are matched to vessel and year by IMO vessel number and event
date, and only deficiencies found during inspections up to one year (365 days) prior to the event
date are included. The resulting database contains 376,508 vessel-year observations with 23,676
accidents and a total of 436,852 deficiencies. Of these 376,508 observations, 129,376 (34%) have
previous inspections of which 69,243 (53%) find deficiencies.
Even though the various PSC regimes use different targeting procedures for their inspection
decisions, they harmonized their coding of deficiencies. Since there over 500 individual deficiency
codes, they are aggregated into eight broad and meaningful groups, see Table 1. Four groups are
primary crew-related: crew qualifications, fatigue management (including rest hours, safe man-
ning, noise, vibration), living conditions, and working conditions. The other four groups are
indirectly related to human factor aspects and concern technical and management aspects: ship
certificates, safety management (including ISM, emergency systems, alarms, fire safety, cargo
operations, navigation and communication operations), pollution prevention, and structural,
machinery, and equipment aspects (including life-saving appliances, navigation and communica-
tion equipment). About one quarter of the deficiency codes belong to the primary crew-related
groups. For each observation, the database contains for each of the eight deficiency groups the
total number of deficiencies detected at inspections up to one year (365 days) prior to the event
date. Table 1 shows some summary statistics of these deficiency counts, as well as of deficiency
indicators that indicate for each group whether a deficiency of that type is encountered at least
once (1) or never (0) during the year prior to the event date. Deficiency counts and indicators are
related to group size, with relatively smaller numbers for the primary crew-related groups than for
the technical and management groups. The percentage of inspections detecting deficiencies ranges
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of accident types and deficiency types.
Acronym Mean St. dev.
Accidents (0/1)
Total loss TL 0.0016 0.0401
TL and very serious TLVS 0.0052 0.0723
TLVS and serious TLVSS 0.0374 0.1898
TLVSS and less serious TLVSSLS 0.0796 0.2707
Deficiencies (0/1)
Crew qualifications CQ 0.0577 0.2332
Fatigue management FM 0.0509 0.2198
Living conditions LC 0.0635 0.2438
Working conditions WC 0.1510 0.3581
Ship certificates SC 0.1123 0.3157
Safety management SM 0.3803 0.4855
Pollution prevention PP 0.1801 0.3843
Structural, machinery, equipment SME 0.4080 0.4915
Sum total of all eight types (CQ—SME) SUM8 1.4038 1.6792
Deficiencies (count)
Crew qualifications CQ 0.0730 0.3368
Fatigue management FM 0.0628 0.3015
Living conditions LC 0.0984 0.4851
Working conditions WC 0.2461 0.7451
Ship certificates SC 0.1683 0.6349
Safety management SM 1.1766 2.4758
Pollution prevention PP 0.2927 0.7840
Structural, machinery, equipment SME 1.4298 3.0956
Sum total of all eight types SUM8 3.5478 6.7482
*The total number of observations (inspected vessels) is 129,376 for January 2010—June 2015.
*Accidents (0/1) has code 1 for at least one accident (for given vessel and year) and 0 for no accident.
*Deficiencies (0/1) has code 1 for one or more deficiencies (for given vessel and year) and 0 for no deficiencies; sum total of all
types is the total number out of the eight types with at least one deficiency.
*Deficiencies (count) gives total count of deficiencies (for given vessel and year); sum total of all types is the sum total of the
number of deficiencies of all eight types.
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from below 10 for fatigue management, crew qualifications, and living conditions to around 40 for
safety management and structural, machinery, and equipment aspects.
Table 1 shows also accident risks for inspected vessels (with 129,376 observations), for which
the average yearly accident probability is 0.16% for total loss, 0.52% for TLVS, 3.74% for TLVSS,
and 7.96% for TLVSSLS. For non-inspected vessels (with 376,508–129,376 = 247,132 observa-
tions) these probabilities are, respectively, 0.19%, 0.40%, 1.63%, and 3.01%. This shows that
accident rates are relatively high for inspected ships, indicating that PSC regimes are successful
in targeting risky ships for inspection.
Casualty risk depends on ship particulars, of which ship type is the most important one. Ship
types included in our analysis are general cargo vessels, dry bulk ships, container ships, tankers,
passenger vessels, and all other ship types but excluding fishing vessels and tugs. These two ship
types are excluded because PSC inspections do not include fishing vessels and because the
accident data is rather incomplete for fishing vessels and tugs. Other relevant ship particulars
include (Knapp 2006, 2013) age and size (gross tonnage) of the vessel; broad classes for classifica-
tion society, flag, owner, document of compliance (DoC) company, ship yard country, and engine
builder and designer; past information on casualties and detentions; past changes in classification
society, flag, owner, and DoC; proxies for maritime expertise in terms of years of existence of
owner and DoC. Due to the large amount of variables, some were regrouped based on the World
Bank classification of countries indicating their income and development (high, upper middle,
lower middle and low income, and unknown). For flags, the classification of Alderton and
Winchester (2002) is used (traditional maritime nation, emerging maritime nation, old open
registry, new open registry, international open registry, and unknown).
4. Methodology
The main purpose of our study is to present a quantitative link between past PSC inspection
outcomes, in particular past deficiencies related to human factor aspects, and the probability of
future shipping accidents. This link on the level of individual vessels is obtained in two steps by
first constructing an index summarizing the deficiency information of the vessel and next relating
this index to future accident risk. We now describe the employed procedures for each step, that is,
principal components (PCs) to construct a deficiency index and logit models to link this index to
future accident probabilities.
Two main statistical features of the deficiency variables summarized in Table 1 are skewness
and correlation. Skewness is indicated in Table 1 by the standard deviation being considerably
larger than the mean. Each deficiency count variable has many zero values, namely when an
inspected vessel has no deficiency of that type in the previous year, but also some very large values
for vessels having many deficiencies in the previous year. Statistical skewness is based on the
standardized third moment of the observations and is 7.4 on average for the deficiency count
variables (ranging from 4.1 for SM to 17.5 for SC). The deficiency indicator (0/1) variables in
Table 1 are much less skewed (2.3 on average, range 0.4–4.1). Another way to reduce skewness is
by taking logarithms of the count variables, that is, if C is the count variable then the log-
transformed variable is ln(1 + C) where ‘ln’ denotes the natural logarithm (1 is added as C often
takes the value zero, namely for vessel inspections without deficiencies). The skewness of the log-
transformed variables is comparable to that of the indicator variables (3.1 on average, range
1.3–4.7).
As the deficiency variables measure various safety aspects, it is not surprising that they show
considerable positive correlation. If a vessel is unsafe then this often shows up along various safety
dimensions. The correlations of the deficiency count variables in Table 1 range from 0.2 to 0.7,
with highest value for SM (safety management) and SME (structural, machinery, equipment).2
Because of these correlations, it will be hard to extract individual effects per deficiency variable on
future accident risk. The various deficiency dimensions can be integrated into fewer components
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that provide maximal discrimination between safe and unsafe inspection outcomes. PC is a well-
established technique for this type of integration. The leading (first) PC is defined as the linear
combination of the original variables that maximizes the variance, and other (second and higher)
PCs do the same under the restriction that they are uncorrelated with previous components. To
eliminate scaling effects, PC will be determined from the correlation matrix of the deficiency
variables and not from the variance-covariance matrix. Note that the eight deficiency groups in
Table 1 vary considerably in size, and using correlations prevents underweighting of smaller
groups. In this way it is guaranteed that the four relatively small but important primary human
factors groups (CQ, FM, LC, WC) are treated on equal footing as the larger indirect human
factors groups (SC, SM, PP, SME).
Table 2 shows summary statistics of five methods to construct the leading PC. One is based on
the eight deficiency count variables (CQ-SME) in Tables 1 and 2 other ones are based on
subgroups, ‘Crew’ for the primary crew-related groups (CQ, FM, LC, WC) and ‘Tech & Man’
for indirect human factor aspects related to technical and management aspects (SC, SM, PP,
SME). Further, PC is also applied on the deficiency indicator variables (‘Dummy’) and on the log-
transformed deficiency count variables (‘Log’). The loadings in Table 2 show the weights on the
original groups to get the leading component. All groups get substantive weight, showing that all
groups are relevant in distinguishing general safety levels of vessels. Similar conclusions follow
from the correlations between the leading component and the individual deficiency variables. The
highest correlations with future accidents are obtained for the log-transformed variables, and this
leading PC (that will be denoted by PC-LOG in the sequel) has also higher correlations with
future accidents than all individual deficiency count variables of Table 1.3 One possible reason for
the better performance of the log-transformed data compared to the original deficiency count data
is that PC acts on the correlation matrix that is sensitive to skewness and outliers. The skewness of
PC-LOG (2.15) is only half of that of the leading component of the deficiency count data (4.28).
For this reason, in Section 5 we will mainly report results based on PC-LOG.
The variance proportion in Table 2 shows the share of the total variation in the deficiency data
explained by the leading component. As PC is based on the correlation matrix, variances are
scaled to 1 and the total variance is equal to the number of variables, that is, 8 if all groups are
included and 4 for the two subgroups. The average variance contribution per PC is therefore,
respectively, 0.125 and 0.25. Table 2 shows that the contribution of the second PC is below
average in all five cases, and higher components have even smaller contributions. These outcomes
support the decision that a single PC suffices to summarize the deficiency information in the 8 (or
4) groups. In practical terms this means that all deficiency groups provide separate measurements
of a single common underlying index of overall safety quality, and the loadings show the relative
weights of the various groups in computing this index.
The second step of our methodology is to link the deficiency index to future accident
probabilities. A simple method is to divide inspected vessels into two groups, relatively risky
ones with high-deficiency index scores and relatively safe ones with low scores. The discrimina-
tory power of the deficiency index can then be evaluated by a comparison-of-means t-test for
future accident probabilities in both groups. Instead of this division in two groups, vessel safety
can also be measured along a continuous scale in terms of the deficiency index. The logit model
provides a simple method to link such a continuous index to dichotomous outcomes, that is,
whether or not the vessel has an accident in the year (365 days) after inspection. Let X denote the
value of the deficiency index, then the probability (P) of an accident is modelled by the formula
P = exp(a+bX)/(1+exp(a+bX)) where ‘exp’ is the exponential function and ‘a’ and ‘b’ are
coefficients to be determined from the data. The coefficient ‘b’ has the interpretation of the
marginal effect of X on the log-odds, that is, ln((P/(1 – P)) = a + bX, where b measures the
marginal increase due to X of the relative probability of having an accident over the probability of
not having an accident.
MARITIME POLICY & MANAGEMENT 7
The above simple model contains only the deficiency index and the resulting estimates measure
the total effect of deficiencies on accident risk, as this effect incorporates that of all other variables
affecting this risk. By including additional risk factors in the model one can measure partial effects
of the deficiency index, that is, the effect of deficiency differences between two vessels that are
identical in all other respects as measured by the other risk factors. An important factor is the type
of ship, as it is well-known that accident risk varies considerably across ship types. By including
ship type dummies in the logit model, the predictive power of deficiency information can be
evaluated after conditioning per ship type. More elaborate logit models are obtained by incorpor-
ating the other risk factors discussed in Section 3, including ship particulars and past information
on changes of these particulars and on detentions and casualties. The resulting logit model is of
the type P = exp(a+bX+cZ)/(1+exp(a+bX+cZ)) where cZ denotes a linear combination of all other
included risk factors besides the deficiency index X. In this model, b measures the (partial) effect
Table 2. Leading principal component of deficiencies measured in various ways
Measurement type Level Dummy Log
Deficiency types included All Crew Tech & Man All All
Descriptive statistics normalized PC
Normalization factor 1.805 1.278 1.555 1.671 1.798
Minimum -0.520 -0.380 -0.517 -0.820 -0.685
Maximum 23.815 30.185 26.954 4.135 9.316
Skewness 4.284 5.451 4.232 1.182 2.152
Variance proportion 0.407 0.408 0.604 0.349 0.404
Variance proportion next component 0.122 0.233 0.199 0.121 0.119
Loadings
Crew qualifications (CQ) 0.263 0.443 – 0.253 0.253
Fatigue management (FM) 0.243 0.427 – 0.251 0.246
Living conditions (LC) 0.272 0.530 – 0.281 0.277
Working conditions (WC) 0.371 0.584 – 0.376 0.371
Ship certificates (SC) 0.293 – 0.356 0.314 0.309
Safety management (SM) 0.462 – 0.562 0.450 0.457
Pollution prevention (PP) 0.391 – 0.497 0.392 0.389
Structural, machinery, equipment (SME) 0.456 – 0.557 0.445 0.453
Correlations with deficiency types
Crew qualifications (CQ) 0.475 0.566 – 0.422 0.455
Fatigue management (FM) 0.439 0.545 – 0.419 0.442
Living conditions (LC) 0.490 0.677 – 0.470 0.498
Working conditions (WC) 0.669 0.746 – 0.628 0.668
Ship certificates (SC) 0.528 – 0.554 0.525 0.555
Safety management (SM) 0.834 – 0.874 0.751 0.821
Pollution prevention (PP) 0.706 – 0.773 0.655 0.699
Structural, machinery, equipment (SME) 0.823 – 0.866 0.743 0.815
Sum total of all 8 types (SUM8) 0.967 0.694 0.969 0.999 0.918
Correlations with accident types
Total loss (TL) 0.044 0.034 0.042 0.042 0.046
TL and very serious (TLVS) 0.031 0.023 0.031 0.031 0.034
TLVS and serious (TLVSS) 0.047 0.039 0.045 0.051 0.052
TLVSS and less serious (TLVSSLS) 0.049 0.045 0.043 0.048 0.052
Table notes
* Measurement type “Level” is principal component (PC) for the count deficiency variables of Table 1, “Dummy”
that for the dummy (0/1) coded deficiencies of Table 1, and “Log” that for log-transformed count variables, that is,
ln(1+DEF) where “DEF” is the count deficiency variable and “ln” denotes the natural logarithm.
* Deficiency type “All” includes all 8 deficiency types, “Crew” includes the four crew-related types CQ, FM, LC, and
WC, and “Tech & Man” includes the four technical and management related types SC, SM, PP, and SME.
* “Descriptive statistics normalized PC” are for the normalized leading (i.e. first) principal component with mean 0 and
variance 1, and “normalization factor” is standard deviation of the non-normalized PC corresponding to the loadings.
* Loadings are normalized weights on the eight deficiency types, with sum of squared weights equal to 1.
* Correlations with deficiency types show correlation of PC with deficiency variables of matched measurement type,
so with dummy coded deficiencies for dummy type PC and with log-transformed deficiency counts for log type PC.
* The average variance proportion is 0.125 for “All” and 0.250 for “Crew” and “Tech & Man”, so that the variance
proportion of the next (second) and higher principal components is below average in all cases.
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of differences in deficiencies on future accident risk for fixed values of Z, that is, for vessels that
are the same in all other respects included in these additional risk factors. Total and partial effects
are both of interest, as the total effect measures the predictive power from deficiency information
alone whereas the partial effect evaluates this power after correcting for the joint predictive power
of all other risk factors. The partial effect therefore answers the question whether PSC inspection
information adds any relevant information over the full set of other risk indicators such as ship
type, age and size of the vessel, flag, owner, and other factors as described in Section 3. All logit
models are estimated by quasi maximum likelihood with robust (Huber–White) standard errors
to account for possible misspecification of the logit models.
5. Results
The results of comparison-of-means tests are shown in Table 3 for the five types of PCs of Table 2
based on deficiency counts (Level), deficiency indicators (Dummy), or log-transformed deficiency
counts (PC-LOG). The subsets of vessels with high and low risk are defined in terms of the sample
mean of the deficiency index, with high risk for scores above the mean and low risk for scores at
or below the mean. The significance of t-tests for different mean accident probabilities between
the two groups is assessed by using robust standard errors that are insensitive to the hetero-
scedasticity present in the data. All outcomes show highly significant and quite considerable
differences in accident risk in both groups. Compared to vessels with relatively few deficiencies,
those with relatively many have about six times higher risk for total loss accidents, two times
higher for total loss and very serious, 50% higher for serious, and 30% higher for LS accidents.
The upscaling factor for accident risk for vessels with high compared to low-deficiency scores is
rather stable across all five considered deficiency indices. This holds in particular also for the core
human factor index based on the four crew-related deficiency categories (crew qualifications,
fatigue management, living conditions, and working conditions). Even though these four cate-
gories are relatively small both in terms of number of deficiency codes (about 25% of all) and
Table 3. Comparison of means test of accident probabilities for low and high deficiency groups
Principal component type Level Dummy Log
Deficiency types included All Crew Tech & Man All All
Proportion high 0.2907 0.2345 0.2930 0.4005 0.3398
Total loss Low 0.0007 0.0009 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005
High 0.0039 0.0038 0.0040 0.0032 0.0037
High / Low 5.8782 4.1152 6.3933 6.0926 6.8367
t-value 9.7474 7.8801 10.0638 10.2710 10.4986
TL and very serious Low 0.0039 0.0043 0.0038 0.0038 0.0037
High 0.0085 0.0083 0.0087 0.0074 0.0082
High / Low 2.1497 1.9142 2.2946 1.9599 2.1793
t-value 8.7744 7.0524 9.4849 8.3270 9.2562
TLVS and serious Low 0.0323 0.0335 0.0321 0.0309 0.0314
High 0.0499 0.0501 0.0502 0.0471 0.0490
High / Low 1.5433 1.4930 1.5632 1.5230 1.5592
t-value 13.8737 12.0093 14.3086 14.4529 14.7697
TLVSS and less serious Low 0.0731 0.0744 0.0727 0.0721 0.0721
High 0.0956 0.0968 0.0963 0.0909 0.0941
High / Low 1.3090 1.3014 1.3242 1.2612 1.3046
t-value 12.9522 11.8507 13.5355 12.0080 13.3168
Table notes
* See Table 1 for the accident type acronyms, and see Table 2 for the five principal component types.
* For each principal component, the table shows the mean accident risk per vessel per year for the groups
“Low” and “High”, that is, for deficiency scores respectively below and above the sample average; the
t-value tests for significant difference of means in the two groups, using heteroskedasticity robust (White)
standandard errors; all p-values are below 0.00005 and are not reported in the table.
* The row “Proportion high” shows the proportion of observations in the group “High”.
* The rows “High / Low” show the relative accident risk in the group “High” compared to the group “Low”.
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number of detected deficiencies at inspections (about 15% of all), their discriminatory power for
detecting future accident risk falls only slightly below that of using all available deficiency
information.
Next we determine logit models to link past deficiency information to future accident risk. The
results are shown in Table 4 for two deficiency indices, one based on the four core human factor
related deficiency counts (PC-Crew) and another based on all eight log-transformed deficiency
counts (PC-LOG). The two indices give similar results for each of the twelve models, with
significantly higher accident probabilities for vessels with higher deficiency index scores.4 For
both indices, the constant term increases and the marginal effect decreases for decreasing
seriousness of the accident, corresponding to higher base level risks and smaller deficiency effects.
Stated otherwise, deficiency information is particularly important for more serious accident types.
Because all deficiency indices have similar performance, in the sequel we will report mainly the
results for PC-LOG for reasons discussed in Section 4.5
Figure 1 (left panel) summarizes the results of the basic model for PC-LOG in graphical format
to assess the accident risk in the coming year for any specific vessel in terms of its deficiency index
score PC-LOG. For any vessel, PC-LOG is computed by the following five steps: (1) collect the
eight deficiency count data (CQ-SME) over the previous year; (2) log-transform each of these
counts (C) to get ln(1 + C); (3) standardize these log-scores by subtracting the sample mean and
by dividing by the sample standard deviation; (4) compute the weighted average of these
standardized scores with loading weights shown in the last column of Table 2; (5) normalize
this average by dividing by the normalization factor in Table 2 (i.e. 1.798). To illustrate its use,
suppose that a vessel inspection finds one deficiency in each of the eight groups and that all these
deficiencies are resolved so that the next inspection finds no deficiencies anymore. In steps 1–2,
the log-scores drop from ln(2) = 0.693 to ln(1) = 0, and steps 3–5 give that PC-LOG drops from
2.55 to −0.68. Figure 1 shows corresponding reductions in yearly accident risk, for example, for
Table 4. Logit estimates of effect of deficiencies (measured by PC-LOG or PC-Crew) on accident probabilities
Basic (1) Ship type (6) Full (35)
Model (# risk factors) Coeff St. Error Z-stat Coeff St. Error Z-stat Coeff St. Error Z-stat
Total loss
A. Constant -6.680 0.075 -89.001 -3.980 0.083 -48.227 -4.447 1.458 -3.050
PC-LOG 0.556 0.026 21.378 0.566 0.035 15.995 0.294 0.065 4.554
B. Constant -6.495 0.070 -92.728 -3.795 0.077 -48.968 -4.414 1.441 -3.064
PC-Crew 0.251 0.021 12.086 0.272 0.026 10.615 0.111 0.042 2.621
TL and very serious
A. Constant -5.309 0.040 -132.996 -3.210 0.057 -56.393 -4.449 0.444 -10.021
PC-LOG 0.320 0.023 13.763 0.303 0.026 11.611 0.184 0.036 5.177
B. Constant -5.265 0.039 -136.056 -3.166 0.058 -54.364 -4.347 0.439 -9.912
PC-Crew 0.169 0.016 10.810 0.161 0.017 9.369 0.074 0.027 2.719
TLVS and serious
A. Constant -3.273 0.015 -219.291 -2.217 0.039 -57.368 -2.117 0.181 -11.708
PC-LOG 0.219 0.011 19.451 0.172 0.012 14.148 0.202 0.016 12.716
B. Constant -3.259 0.015 -221.136 -2.206 0.039 -56.733 -2.017 0.179 -11.255
PC-Crew 0.138 0.010 14.427 0.109 0.010 11.003 0.096 0.013 7.569
TLVSS and less serious
A. Constant -2.460 0.010 -237.096 -1.649 0.032 -52.272 -1.444 0.140 -10.307
PC-LOG 0.164 0.009 18.455 0.113 0.010 11.753 0.192 0.013 15.139
B. Constant -2.455 0.010 -237.869 -1.647 0.032 -52.033 -1.356 0.139 -9.734
PC-Crew 0.124 0.008 15.714 0.096 0.008 11.818 0.111 0.011 10.457
Table notes
* The total number of observations is 128,697, and see Table 1 for the number of accidents of each type.
* Z-statistics are computed by means of heteroskedasticity-robust (Huber-White) standard errors.
* In the full model, variables were pre-selected and insignificant variables were not removed.
* The deficiency variable in case A (PC-LOG) is the principal component of 8 log-transformed deficiency counts and in case B
(PC-Crew) it is the principal component of the 4 crew-related deficiency counts, see Table 2; both components are normalized
to have mean 0 and variance 1.
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TLVSS accidents from 6.2 to 3.2%. The inspection benefits of detecting and solving deficiencies
can be evaluated in this way.
Figure 1 (left panel) depicts the total effect of deficiencies on accident risk. This total effect
includes all effects of other relevant accident risk factors, of which ship type is the major one. The
annual probability for TLVS accidents, for example, is 0.17% for tankers, 0.26% for dry bulk,
0.33% for containers, 0.35% for general cargo, 1.04% for passenger, and 4.14% for other ships. The
number of deficiencies detected at inspections also varies per ship type, with averages of 1.80 for
tankers, 2.44 for container, 2.83 for dry bulk, 3.52 for other, 4.30 for passenger, and 5.83 for
general cargo.6 The box plots in Figure 2 show that the deficiency index PC-LOG varies accord-
ingly across the six ship types, again with highest scores for general cargo and lowest for tankers.
It is therefore of interest to correct for the ship type effect and to link PC-LOG to accident risk per
ship type. The resulting coefficients of PC-LOG and PC-Crew after correction of ship type effects
are shown in Table 4 (model ‘Ship type’).7 The marginal effects remain nearly the same as before
for TL and TLVS, but they are somewhat smaller for TLVSS and TLVSSLS. Figure 1 (middle
panel) shows the effect of PC-LOG on TLVS accidents in graphical format per ship type.8 The










































Figure 1. Effect of deficiencies on accident risk. Probability of an accident in the next year as function of the deficiency variable
PC-LOG, which is the leading principal component of eight types of deficiencies (SC through SME, see Tables 1 and 2) with
counts DEF transformed by ln(1+DEF); PC-LOG is normalized to have mean 0 and variance 1. Left panel: total effects for four
types of accident. Middle panel: total effects for TLVS accidents per ship type: tanker (Tan), dry bulk (Dry), general cargo (Gen),
Container (Con), Passenger (Pax), and other (Other) excluding fishing vessels and tugs. Right panel: partial effects for TLVS
accidents of two hypothetical passenger ships, A (relatively safe) and B (relatively risky); Pax is the relation for passenger ships
without correcting for ship particulars and is the same as the Pax curve in middle diagram, but measured on different vertical
scales.
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bulk, and containers (p-value 0.274), whereas the risk of tankers is smaller and that of passenger
vessels and especially of other ship types is considerably larger. Note that this figure compares the
accident risk of various ship types for given PC-LOG, so that the TLVS accident risk of general
cargo vessels tends to be higher than that of dry bulk and container ships because general cargo
vessels have on average more deficiencies (see Figure 2).
Finally, we evaluate the partial effects of PSC inspection data for predicting future accident risk.
This concerns the question whether the inspection data provide any supplementary risk informa-
tion in addition to the set of other risk indicators discussed in Section 3, that is: ship type; age and
size; classification society, flag, owner, DoC company, ship yard country, engine builder and
designer; past information on casualties and detentions; past changes in classification society, flag,
owner, and DoC; proxies for maritime expertise in terms of years of existence of owner and DoC.
The logit model contains 35 variables, and the coefficients of PC-LOG and PC-Crew are shown in
Table 4 (model ‘Full’).9 The partial effects have about half the size of the total effects for TL and
TLVS, but they remain roughly the same for TLVSS and TLVSSLS. The reduced importance for
TL and TLVS is due to cross-correlations of the additional individual risk factors with accidents
and deficiencies.
The resulting logit models, for example those with PC-LOG, can be used to evaluate the risk of
any vessel by means of the following steps: (1) determine the deficiency index PC-LOG as
described earlier; (2) compute the logit score L = a+bX+cZ, where X = PC-LOG, Z contains the
other risk factors, and a, b, c are the coefficients of the logit model; (3) the probability of an
accident in the next year (365 days) is estimated by P = exp(L)/(1+exp(L)). It may also be of
interest, for example to assist PSC authorities in their inspection decisions, to compare the
relation between deficiencies and accident risk for alternative sets of risk scores. We illustrate
this with a hypothetical case of two passenger ships, a relatively safe one (A) and a relatively risky
one (B) in the sense that A is of smaller size (25,000 dwt) than B (100,000 dwt), the flag of A is
traditional and that of B is old open registries, the engine builder and designer are known for A
but not for B, and B had recent changes of classification society and owner but A had not. This
combination of risk factors implies that the factor cZ will be larger for ship B than for ship A. The
right panel of Figure 2 shows the risk curves linking PC-LOG to TLVS accident risk for ships A
and B.10 Such risk curves specialized to the level of individual vessels can help PSC authorities to
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Figure 2. Box plots of deficiency variable PC-LOG per ship type. Box plots of the deficiency variable PC-LOG; dot in box is
sample mean and line in box is sample median (if invisible it lies at bottom of the box); ship types are general cargo (1), dry
bulk (2), container (3), tanker (4), passenger (5), and other (6) excluding fishing vessels and tugs; PC-LOG scores above 5 are
exceptional and occur for 0.26% of all observations.
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6. Discussion and conclusion
Safety at sea is important for all involved parties, including ship and cargo owners, crew, port
authorities, insurance companies, and others. Current trends show improved technological vessel
reliability combined with higher human stress factors. These human factor aspects have therefore
recently attracted more attention in the analysis and prevention of maritime accidents. Because
accidents usually originate from complex interconnected causes, most studies are of a retro-
spective nature based on a limited number of accident reports or on relatively small-scale case
studies.
This paper proposes a prospective method to relate human factor aspects to the probability of
future shipping accidents, where human factor indicators are derived from deficiencies detected
during PSC inspections. The refined deficiency information with over 500 individual codes is
summarized into eight main human factor aspects, and it is shown that these factors can be
condensed into a single deficiency index that summarizes the overall safety condition on the level
of individual vessels. The method of PCs is used to construct the deficiency index that maximizes
the discrimination between safe and risky ships. This index score is transformed into predicted
probabilities for future accidents by means of logit models. The total effect of past deficiencies on
future accident risk is obtained by simple logit models that incorporate only the index score, and
more elaborate logit models provide partial effects corrected for other risk factors included in the
model.
The main findings are the following. The risk of a shipping accident in the next year is
significantly higher for vessels with bad inspection outcomes than for those with good outcomes.
The factor by which this accident risk increases for bad compared to good vessels is about 6 for
total loss, 2 for very serious, 1.5 for serious, and 1.3 for LS accidents. For every vessel, its risk of
various accident types can easily be related to the deficiencies detected at previous PSC inspec-
tions. This is done both at the highest aggregation level, using only the inspection data, and at
lower levels after correcting for ship type and other ship particulars. For practical use, the link
functions between inspection outcomes and accident risk are represented in graphical form.
The results show strong correspondence between past deficiencies and future accident risk,
especially for high classes of seriousness. These outcomes are of interest, for example, for PSC
authorities to target their scarce inspection resources and for insurance companies to develop
actuarial procedures that reflect major risk factors. They may also be of interest for management
purposes, for example, to evaluate priorities in safety management. The incorporation of PSC
inspection outcomes can also add an extra layer of information in a multi-layered approach to
risk evaluation (Vander Hoorn and Knapp 2015) where ship-specific risk is combined with
other risk factors like traffic densities, met-ocean conditions, coastal sensitivities, and surveil-
lance options.
Two main advantages of the proposed methodology are the following. First, both steps of the
empirical method, i.e. construction of the deficiency index and estimation of the link between this
index and future accident risk, employ global data on vessels, inspections, and accidents. The
methodology is therefore based on broad and deep databases covering the globe, as opposed to
small-scale previous studies. Second, although targeting strategies differ across the various PSC
regimes, they use well-established and internationally harmonized deficiency codes. This simpli-
fies a global analysis greatly, in contrast with studies of accident reports that are not standardized
and for which it is hard to extract relevant information in an objective way.
Our methodology also has some weaknesses. The human factor information obtained from
inspections is rather indirect compared to (ex post) micro data derived from accident investiga-
tion reports. Further, risk assessment is based on inspected ships so that information on ships that
were inspected long ago is not up-to-date. This limitation could be mitigated by intensifying
inspection frequencies, but this should be balanced against associated negative human factor
effects if vessel crews become overloaded with administration and inspection burdens.
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Notes
1. The Appendix contains some background information on data (Table A1) and models (Table A2).
2. Table A1 shows the correlations between the eight deficiency count variables of Table 1 as well as the
correlations of these variables with four accident types.
3. This can be easily checked by comparison with Table A1.
4. The magnitude of the slope parameters cannot be compared directly, because the indices PC-LOG and PC-
Crew are normalized whereas the underlying deficiency variables have different scales. The average sample
mean of the four deficiency counts for PC-Crew is 0.12 and that of the eight log-counts for PC-LOG is 0.07.
This means that, after normalization, one unit of PC-LOG is roughly twice as large as one unit of PC-Crew
in terms of underlying deficiencies, which is reflected in Table 4 by slopes of PC-LOG being roughly twice
that of PC-Crew.
5. Results for the other deficiency indices are available upon request.
6. Table A1 shows the average number of deficiencies per inspection per ship type for each of the eight
deficiency groups. The results indicate a stable ranking of ship types across the various deficiency dimen-
sions. General cargo, for example, has most deficiencies along almost all dimensions, and tankers have the
fewest.
7. Table A2 shows the results of PC-LOG for TLVS in more detail, that is, including the ship type dummies.
Here ‘Other ship types’ is taken as benchmark class, and the negative coefficients of all ship type dummies
show that this benchmark class has the highest average annual TLVS accident risk. For given deficiency
score, TLVS risk is smallest for tankers and largest for passenger ships, whereas containers, dry bulk, and
general cargo fall in between. Results for other accident types and other deficiency indices are qualitatively
similar and are available upon request.
8. The curve in the middle diagram is obtained from the ‘ship type’ model for PC-LOG in Table A2.
9. Table A2 shows the results of the full model with PC-LOG for TLVS in more detail, and the last two
columns of this table show the correlation of each risk factor with TLVS accidents and with the PC-LOG
deficiency index. Results for other accident types and other deficiency indices are qualitatively similar and
are available upon request.
10. The curve in the right diagram is obtained from the ‘full’ model for PC-LOG in Table A2.
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Appendix
Table A1. Average deficiencies per ship type and correlations, both across deficiency types and with accident types.
Acronym CQ FM LC WC SC SM PP SME SUM8
Average deficiencies per inspection
General cargo (29.7%) 0.262 0.112 0.118 0.164 0.394 1.963 0.494 2.327 5.833
Dry bulk (26.5%) 0.107 0.049 0.038 0.096 0.213 0.928 0.211 1.187 2.830
Container (14.2%) 0.104 0.045 0.036 0.043 0.189 0.808 0.201 1.010 2.437
Tanker (20.4%) 0.107 0.051 0.027 0.050 0.111 0.580 0.160 0.713 1.798
Passenger (3.6%) 0.284 0.095 0.054 0.081 0.283 1.507 0.291 1.705 4.300
Other (5.6%) 0.272 0.112 0.091 0.090 0.231 1.079 0.331 1.318 3.523
All six ship types (100%) 0.168 0.073 0.063 0.08 0.246 1.177 0.293 1.430 3.548
Cross correlations of deficiency types
Crew qualifications CQ 1 0.190 0.150 0.205 0.267 0.308 0.224 0.270 0.380
Fatigue management FM 1 0.130 0.200 0.195 0.304 0.213 0.238 0.349
Living conditions LC 1 0.365 0.177 0.284 0.226 0.296 0.408
Working conditions WC 1 0.229 0.449 0.358 0.482 0.605
Ship certificates SC 1 0.339 0.278 0.316 0.456
Safety management SM 1 0.544 0.729 0.895
Pollution prevention PP 1 0.538 0.665
Structural, machinery, equipment SME 1 0.917
Sum total of all eight types SUM8 1
Correlations with accident types
Total loss TL 0.021 0.017 0.025 0.024 0.021 0.041 0.030 0.037 0.044
TL and very serious TLVS 0.013 0.012 0.016 0.018 0.014 0.030 0.021 0.028 0.032
TLVS and serious TLVSS 0.018 0.011 0.031 0.035 0.024 0.045 0.027 0.040 0.048
TLVSS and less serious TLVSSLS 0.023 0.007 0.034 0.045 0.028 0.044 0.023 0.037 0.047
*The deficiency variables are the count variables of Table 1; see Table 1 also for the meaning of count variable SUM8.
*General cargo (29.7%) means that 29.7% of all inspections concern general cargo, and similar for the other ship types.
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